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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
EDITH~.

GARDNER,
1'/ai ntiff, Respondent

)
(

vs.

Ca:-;t> No. 73J2

EARL W. GARDNER,
Defendant, Appellant

(
J

APPELLANT'S
~TATEl\fENT

BRIEF

OF FACTS

In this case the plaintiff-respondent filed an action
to dissolve the bonds of rnatrimony existing between the
plaintil'f and the defendant alleging rnental cruelty and
non-support in her cornplaint.

Appellant-defendant

denied the jurisdictional facts alleged in tlw complaint
and also denied the allegations of rnental cruelty and
non-support.
herself was

Defendant further alleged that plaintiff
guilt~~

of misconduct and that she had con-

doned any misconduct on the

defendant·~

part (R. 8, 9,

10, 11, 12 and 14). A decrt>e of divon·e wa~ entered
in favor of the plaintiff-re::;pondent based on rnental
cruelty '(H. :2;>).

rrhis is an appeal frorn the decree.
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This appeal presents three basic questions (1) whether
the lower court had jurisdiction to enter a decree, (2)
whether on the evidence the decree of divorce was
proper, and (3) whther the plaintiff was entitled to an
allowance for attorney's fee.
The respondent and appellant were married at Pocatello, Idaho, on June 15, 1948 (R. 8), and the respondent filed an action for divorce approximately four
months later on October 28, 1948 (R. 3). The appellant
was a friend of the respondent's fmnily (R. 73). The
parties had known each other for twenty years, and
during that time appellant and respondent had been in
each other's cmnpany quite a bit. Before the marriage,
the parties had discussed getting ma-rried at an earlier
time, but the appellant preferred to wait until arrangements were made to take care of respondent's mother
(R. 63, 64, 129 and 130). 'rhe respondent's mother was
in poor health and she wa~ with the appellant anrl
respondent from the time of their marriage until the
divorce action was filed. The appellant only had two
days alone with his wife when relatiYes and friends
were not present. (R. 141). In the brief period of the
marriage a few quarrels resulted. The parties did not
have a serious quarrel pertaining to themselves individually--Pvery disagreement the~· had concerned a friend
or relative (R. 140). How<->YPr, the appellant was kinrl
and considerate of his mother-in-law who lived with him
during the marriage (see paragraph 11 of Finding-~
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of Faet. R.

:2:~.

abo H. 149).

Prior to the n1arriage the respondent lived wtih her
mother in Log-an, l ~ tah, while the appellant lived on
a fann which he owned at Santaquin, l~tah (H. 127).
~\ t the tiine of the Inarriage, he was in the process of
f;elling it (H. G;) ). rrhe sale was cmnpleted on Septem-ber 23, 19-t~. at which time the appellant moved his
things away frmn the fann (H. 127 and 128). At the
tiiue of the Inarriage, the parties had planned on 1naking
a trip leaving Logan, going through Yellowstone Park,
~r ontana, \Yashington and down the Pacific Coast until
the:· found a plaeP th<>y liked for a pennanent home
(H. 128). This trip never Inaterialir.ed, the nwther waR
ill and couldn't he left alone so the parties stayed at
the home of the respondent's mother in Logan, 1~tali
(R. 38, ti:), 6-l:, 65 and 66). The appellant never intended
to lll~lkP Logan l1is hmne (H. 129). \Vithin a day or so
<~ftpr the sale of the farn1 was complete (September 2~.
1D-iS), the parties packed their belonging~ and left for
California to rnake their hon1e (R. -l-8, 130 and 131).
'Tlw~· took the nwther-in-law along with them (H. 131).
Before the rnarriage the partie~ had visited California (R. 129) and had definitel:· decided to Inake
California their home after the 111arriagP (H. ();) and
131 ). 'YhilP in Ftah, the partiP~ had written to real
<·:-;tatP men in California in an E~ffort to line up a place
to livE:> ( H.(ili). They paek<><l their belongings, took part
of theu1 with theu1 and left tlw relllain<lP r in a c-ondition
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to be shipped at a later tin1e (R. 131 and 66).

They

left Utah intending to make California their home (R. 66
and 131, Defendant's Exhibit I). After they had arrived
in California, they

imrnediatel~'

began looking for a

home to buy and finally found one that was suitable.
They both signed the contract for the purchase of the
home which was located at Windsor, California, and
made payments on the purchase price (R. 49, 61 and
132). The appellant took the proceeds from the sale
of his farm ( $4000.00), and the respondent added
$1400.00 of her own money and a joint bank account
was established in a California bank (R. 50 and 132).
While waiting for the home they had purchased to be
vacated, the parties quarreled, and they made a trip
back to Utah, arriving October 16, 1948 (R. 51 and 146).
Only twelve days later the respondent filed a divorce
action in the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache,
alleging that she had been a bon~ fide resident of Cache
County for more than three rnonths prior to the filing
of the action (R. 3). After the divorce action was
conunenced the appellant returned to California to do
some remodeling work on the home that they had purchased (R. 59 and 136). He thought that the divorce
action would be called off (R. 1;)5). The appellant wrote
respondent a letter from Cailfornia, sent her $50.00 for
a ticket and asked her to return to hin1 (R. 139 and 70).
The appellant considered him~elf still a resident of
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California (R. 70, 1-!0 and 190). He owns no property
in rtah (R. 188).
~TArl,E~IENrr

OF ERROR

Appellant relies upon the following errors committed

by the trial court for reversal of the judgrnent decree
of

thi~

Court below:

1. The trial court erred in entering a decree in favor

of the plaintiff since tlw lower court did not have
jurisdiction to render a divorce decree.

2. The court erred in entering paragraph one of
it~

Findings of Facts for the reason that the undisputed
evidence shows that the plaintiff was not a bona fide
resident of the State of Utah, in the County of Cache,
for nwre than three months prior to the cmnrnencmnent
of the action.
:~.

The court erred in awarding to the plaintiff judgment against the defendant for attorney's fees in thf'
;-;mu of $1;10.00 for the reason that the plaintiff neither
allt-g·pfl nor approved an attorney'~ fPP.
-!-. The court erred in entering paragraph eight of
tlu· Findings of Facts for tliP reason that the plaintiff
neither alleged nor approved any attonw)''s fee.

:>. r_rhe court t-rred in entering a decree of divorce
in

of the plaintiff for the reason that the evidence
dew~ not support or justify a dPel'PP of divorce in favor
l"a\'OI'

o t' tlte plaintiff.
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6. The court erred in entering paragraphs four, five
and six of the F"'indings of Facts for the reason that
said paragraphs are not supported by the evidence.

7. The court erred in entering paragraphs, one, two,
three, four, five and six of the Conclusions of Law for
the reason that the court did not have jurisdiction to
enter a decree, and for the further reason that the
evidence does not support nor justify a decree in favor
of the plaintiff.
POINT NO. I-rrHE LOWER COURT DID NOT
HAVE JURISDICTION TO J1jNTER A DECREE
OF DIVORCE.
This point coven; Assignment of Errors No. 1 and
No.2.
The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Gardner owned
property and lived in Santaquinn, 1I tah, prior to the
rnarriage, and that his ownership continued down unit]
September 23, 1948, and that he had a place to live on.
his farm even though a part of the premises was occu-pied by a tenant. He considered himself domiciled in
Santaquinn and while selling the farm at Santaquinn,
he temporarily sta?ed in Logan with the plaintiff. l\f rs.
Gardner admitted that even before the marriage they
were discussing California as their future home. Ther<'
is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that thesr
parties intended to rnake their permanent home in Logan
with Mrs. Yonk. It would seem (•lear that the stay in
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Logan wa8 n1erely tetnporary while the farm property
in Santaquinn wa8 being sold. It is submitted that the
ten1porary arrangement in Logan was not sufficient to
constitute Logan a8 the domicile of the parties during
that period of tin1e (see l(idman vs. Kidman, 164 P 2d
201, in which this Court stated, ''We assume that the
phrase 1neans the maintenance therein of something
more than a In ere •legal residence' ''.).

I
l-

t·

n

I
I

e /

In Septen1ber, 1948, after the farm property was
sold, the parties packed their belongings, took the full
proceeds of the farm sale, together with $1400.00 of
:\Irs. Gardner's money, and rnoved to California, purchased a home and opened a bank account. Even Mrs.
Gardner stated that it was their intention to live in
California if they could make a go of it. Mr. Gardner
is nwre emphatic that the parties definitely intended
to make California their hon1e. However, Mrs. Gardner'~ intention, even with its reservation, is sufficient
to constitute California their horne. Section 31 of Volmne 17, Auwrican .Jurisprudence, at Page 609 sets down
the well established rule that if a person is actually
rnoved fron1 one place to another with intention of
remaining in the latter place for an indefinite time,
suel1 latter place is deemed the domicile, notwithstanding
he may entertain a floating intention to return to his
previous domicile at sorne future time. Section 24 oi
the sarne volume at Page 605 restates this general rule
and eonfirn1s the position of appellant that the partie~
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did make California their home and were domicile<\
there at the time this divorce action was com1nenced.

It is undisputed frmn the evidence that the partiet-'
deposited large sums of money in a joint bank account
in California, purchased a hmne which they hoth selected,
and were waiting in ( ~alifornia for the hmne to become
vacant so Hwy could permanently move into it. Section
33 of the same volume of American .Juris prudence at
Page 611 states the general rule that a person nwvin~ot
into a state with the intention of 1naking his home.
obtains his dmnicile in that State although he has not
settled in a permanent home there (see also ;) A. L. R.
298, 16 A. L. R. 1298, White v. Tennant, 8 S. E. 596).
The fact that :Mr. Gardner regarded California his home
is further borne out by the fact that after the California
home became vacant he entered into it and made
extensive repairs and he remodeled the place. He got
it ready for his wife and requested that she come and
live at their home. However, in the meantime, she hacl
returned to Logan, and after being in rtah for thP
~hort period of twelve days, slle counnenced divoree
proceedings.
Section 40-3-1, 1 tah Code Annotated, 1943, provide~
that the Court shall have jurisdiction to hear a divoree
('as(:' if the plaintiff has been an actual and bona fid('
resident of the State and of tlw ( ~ounty in which action
is brought for three months next prior to thP cmnmencement of the action. 1t is submitted that regardless o(
T
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the way the facts are interpreted, it is clear that
requiren1ent was not met.
in the

~tate

Complaint.
1
(

~I rH.

thi~

Gardner had only been

twelve days at the tiine she filed her
Prior to that tirne, she was a resident of

alifornia and prior to her residence in California, -she

was don1iciled in Santaquinn, Utah, with her husband
(Section :21, Restatement of the Law of Conflict of
Laws).

The

caHe

of Speak vs. Speak, 19 P 2d 386,

states the rule that the husband's domicile is the wife's
dornicile, and that the husband has the right to change
that domicile.

Mr. Gardner considered himself domi-

ciled in Santaquinn until he changed his domicile to
California. He considered, and the facts certainly support him, that the stay in Logan, Utah, was merely
ternporary and did not constitute a residence within the
meaning of Section 40-3-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943
(Kidman vs. ICidman supra; Grant vs. Lawrence, 108
· Pac. 931).
Ij~ven

though it is argued that the domicile of both
of the parties was in Logan, Utah, prior to the time
tlw~· left for California, and that that they did not
acquire a perrnanent domicile in California, nevertheless 1\Irs. Gardner was only in the State for twelve days
immediately prior to the commencement of the action.
It seems ('onclusive that the lower Court did not haYt'
jurisdic-tion to Pnter an interlocutor~· divorce decree
( 159 .:\. L. R. -!!)1; Sneed vs. Sneed, 123 Pac. 312).
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POINT NO. II-Fr \VAS AN AH tTSB~ OF
COrRT 'S

DISCR:B~rf ION
1

TH~~

TO ALLOW RESPOND-

ENT AN ATrrORNEY'S FEE.
This point covers Assignrnent of Errors No. 3 and
~ 0.

4.

rrhe respondent's original cmnplaint and her

amended complaint contained absolutely no allegations
concerning an allowance of an attorney's fee to
respondent.

th<c~

Furthermore, there was no prayer in the

original or arnended complaint asking for an· allowancP
for an attorney's fee. At the trial of the action, thP
respondent failed to introduce any evidence concerning
an allowance of an attorney's fee, and the appellant
specifically objected to any award to the plaintiff for
an attorney's fee (R. 203). Although it may well be
argued that the Court can set an attorney's fee in a
divorce without taking te~timony (see Anderson vt-~.
Anderson, 181 Pac. 168. and .Jenkins vs. .Jenkins, 1:l::1
P 2d 262), still it is suhrnitted that it i~ an abuse of
the Court's descretion to award an attorney's fee in
this case in the absence of allegations, a prayer, or any
proof concerning such fpes. There was no issue before thP
Court on the matter and no attorn<>~-'~ fpp should be
allowed.

POINT NO. III-rrHJ1J J·~VIDE~CE BE~FORij~ rri I 1~~
COrRT DORS NOT .Tr~T1FY THR FINDl~O~
OF FACT, CONCLlT~;IONS OF LAW AND
DECREE.
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This point covers Assign1nent of Erros No. 5, 6
and 7.
i~

The Findings of Fact, upon which this decree

based,

~tate

in substance that the appellant was of

a quarrelsmne nature and jealous of the respondent's
relatiYes and because of a few quarrels was guilty of
1uental cruelty. An exa1nination of the record will show
that these quarrels did not result solely because of any
bad ten1per or jealousy upon the part of the appellant,
but that if fault in these quarrels is to be placed, the
respondent n1ust bear a full share of any responsibility
for these quarrels. They were not unprovoked or
unjustified. The evidence shows that the respondent was
a highly nervous, irritable woman, who had a quick
te1nper, and that frequently the appellant was the recipient of the effects of this ten1per (R. 53 and 57). The
appellant in his arnended answer to the amended com-plaint alleges as affirmative defense that the respondent
herself was guilty of misconduct. It is a fundamental
rule that if both parties to the action are guilty of misconduct, then neither party can recover a divorce
(Ahlbmn vs. Ahlborn, 204 P 99: Hartwell vs. Hartwell,
6~) Pac. 205.) Although it is not possible to quote the
rather voluminous record to bear out the appellant'~
contention, it is felt that the record will arnply support
thP proposition that the respondent's conduct toward
tlw appellant was anything but exemplary, and certainly she does not come before the Court as the innocent
vietim of the appellant's jealous or bad disposition (R.
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82, 92 and 101).
Furthermore, we feel that the alleged acts of mentai
cruelty are trivial and inconsequential. Approximately
five quarrels form the basis of respondent's claim of
mental cruelty (R. 38, 40, 47, 51 and :>2).

Each party

had a different explanation of the reason for the quarrels and who was to blarne. It is impossible to give
citations to the record; the record as a whole must be
read on this point. Thos quarrels involved matters
which the parties should have adjusted and resolved
between thernselves. Certainly the divorce laws do not
guarantee a woman that she will not have smne quarrels
with her husband. Admittedly, there were more quarrels here than ·one would like to see in a marriage
relation, but it should be remen1bered that this husband
and wife were living under ver~~ tr~-ing circumstances.
\\T e have pointed out where the parties had their motherin-law with them throughout the entire marriage. The
husband and wife were only alone for approximately
forty-eight hours. There wa~ the problem of the care
of an elderl~- mother-in-law, who was ill. The parties
for several months did not have a home of their own,
and it wasn't until the~, mov_ed to California did they
acquire one. The parties were passing through a transition period in attempting to adjust themselves to ·their
new lives. The respondent was ha~ty in filing the
divorce action, but she felt that she couldn't turn bacl\
after the action had been filed ( R. 140 and 155). 1\)
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ha~P

a dinH'ee on the

fliln~~·

eYidenee of this case is to

write in ~Pdion 40->>-1. Ptah Code Annotated, 1943, as
mnended the grounds of tmnporary incon1patability and
rt-~t it under the grounds of rnental curelty (Cawley vs.
Cawley, :202 Pac. 10). Before too much emphasis is
placed on the trivial quarrels of the parties, it shoulcl
be pointed out again that the appellant was an old
friend of the fan1ily, had known the respondt'nt for over
twenty year~. and that evPn before the marriage, the
parties had quarreled and had disputes (R. 106).
Even though it is felt that these trivial quarrels constituted 1nental cruelty on the part of the husband, still
it should be noted that the parties lived together as
husband and wife as late as the first part of October;
1948, (the Complaint was filed toward the last part
of October, 1948). The respondent expressed himself
that that period had been the happiest of her life (R. 82).
The appellant alleged as an affirmative defense condonation. This cohabition of the respondent with appellant
in California and on the trip back to Ftah condoned
improper acts, if any, of the appellant which occurred
before that time·(R. 143 and 89). Certainly, a finding
of rnental cruelty cannot be based on the minor things
that occurred when the parties returned to Utah (Barr
vs. Barr, 10 S.W. (2d) 884~ Hammond vs. Hammond,
132 N.E. 72-!: Heard vs. Heard, 272 S.W. 501).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Court lacked
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jurisdiction to enter an interlocutory degree of divorce,
and furthermore that the Court had insufficient evidence
upon which to base a decree of divorce or the award of
an attorney's fee, and that the judgment of the lower
Court should be reversed and the Complaint dismissed.

lH ~ LLFJN & BELL
Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

